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ABSTRACT
In a series of papers, my colleagues and I have demonstrated that levels of per capita income,
economic growth, and other economic and demographic dimensions are strongly correlated with
geographical and ecological variables such as climate zone, disease ecology, and distance from the
coast. Three recent papers purport to show that the role of geography in explaining cross-country
patterns of income per capita operates predominantly or exclusively through the choice of
institutions, with little direct effect of geography on income after controlling for the quality
institutions. This note shows that malaria transmission, which is strongly affected by ecological











  In a series of papers, my colleagues and I (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger, 1998, 2000; 
Gallup and Sachs, 2001; Sachs and Malaney, 2002) have demonstrated that levels of per capita 
income, economic growth, and other economic and demographic dimensions are strongly 
correlated with key geographical and ecological variables, such as climate zone, disease ecology, 
and distance from the coast.  Several recent papers have explored this link between geography 
and development, testing whether the effects of geography on economic activity work mainly 
through various direct channels (e.g. through effects on productivity, population growth, trade 
and investment) or indirect channels (e.g. through effects on the choice of political and economic 
institutions).  Of course, both kinds of channels may be present simultaneously, and Gallup, 
Sachs, and Mellinger (1998) offer a theoretical illustration as to why a disadvantageous physical 
environment may be conducive to the adoption of less productive institutional arrangements as 
well.   
  Three papers in particular (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Easterly and 
Levine, 2002; and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbis, 2002) purport to show that the role of 
geography in explaining cross-country patterns of income per capita operates predominantly or 
exclusively through the choice of institutions, with little direct effect of geography on income.  
This would indeed be a surprising conclusion, since many of the reasons why geography seems 
to have affected institutional choices in the past (e.g. the suitability of locations for European 
technologies, the disease environment and risks to survival of immigrants, the productivity of 
agriculture, the transport costs between far-flung regions and major markets) are indeed based on 
direct effects of geography on production systems, human health, and environmental 
sustainability, and many of those very same channels would still be likely to apply today.  Thus,   3
the logic of the geography-institutions linkage is also the logic of a direct geography-productivity 
linkage. 
Fortunately, these three papers propose a testable – and refutable – hypothesis that 
geography matters only through institutions, based on the following cross-country regression 
model: 
(1)    ln(Yi)  =  β 0  +   β 1  QIi  +  β 2’ Zi    +   ε i 
The log of income per capita of country i, ln(Yi) , is specified to be a function of the “quality of 
institutions,” according to an index QIi , and one or more other variables Zi, which may include 
geographical, historical or policy variables.  Since income is affected by geography (Z), the 
argument suggests that Z works only through QI, with no direct effects once QI is entered into 
the regression equation.  Specifically, the papers advance the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
vector β 2’ is zero, so geographical (and other “non-institutional”) variables have no additional 
explanatory power beyond their possible indirect role in affecting the quality of institutions: 
(2)  H0 :   β 2’ =  0   
In the empirical test of H0 in the three recent papers, the income variable is purchasing-power-
parity adjusted GNP per capita in 1995 and the institutions variable is a proxy measure of 
institutional quality.   
This current note shows that the null hypothesis in (2) is rejected when the Zi variable is a 
measure of malaria transmission.  In other words, I provide evidence that malaria transmission 
directly impacts the level of per capita income after controlling for institutional quality.  The 
likely reasons for this linkage are described in Gallup and Sachs, 2001, and Sachs and Malaney, 
2002.    Before proceeding to the statistical test, however, it is important to stress that the model 
in (1) is worryingly oversimplified in any case (and thus is certainly not the model of choice that   4
I would specify or prefer to test).  No reliable conclusions about the primacy of institutions over 
other variables should.  The first obvious specification problem is one of statics versus dynamics.  
Economic theory suggests that the determination of per capita income should be specified as a 
dynamic process (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997), in which the growth of income during a 
time interval [0,T] is a function of the income level at the start of the period and some kind of 
average of the values of the “forcing variables” during the time interval [0,T]: 
(3)  (1/T)ln(YiT/Yi0) =  β 0  +  β 1  QIi[0,T]  +  β 2 ’ Zi[0,T]   +   β 3  ln(Yi0)  +  ε i 
It is much more likely that the quality of institutions in a given time period will affect the growth 
rate of the economy during that period (controlling for initial income), as opposed to the 
contemporaneous level of national income.  It is also very doubtful that a process as complex as 
economic development can possibly be explained by two or three variables alone, much less the 
particular “geography” variables stressed by AJR and RST.  Distance from the equator, the 
centerpiece of testing in RST, is an exceedingly poor choice for a serious test of geographical 
variables.
1  It is at best a proxy, and a poor one at that, for climate or possibly for distance from 
major markets, and should not be used as the basis of the bulk of the tests in the RST paper when 
much better alternatives are available.  In any event, most geographical analyses stress several 
factors (climate, geographical isolation, disease environment), so that testing these variables one 
at a time is subject to extreme risk of left-out-variable error. 
The purpose of this note, however, is to show that even within narrow confines of 
equation (1) the null hypothesis is easily refuted.  I focus on one particular variable, malaria risk.  
It is easy to show that highly malarious regions of the world (i.e. regions where there is a high 
                                                 
1 I have made this point elsewhere in Sachs (2000).  It is interesting in this regard that when this variable was 
introduced by Hall and Jones (1999), it was taken to be a proxy for European settlement, not a proxy for geography 
per se.  It is, incidentally, a fairly miserable measure for European settlement as well, another case in which much 
more direct measures are readily available.   5
risk of malaria transmission) have lower per capita income that non-malarious regions, 
controlling for the quality of government institutions.  Moreover, since malaria transmission is 
strongly related to ecological conditions (specifically the type of mosquito vectors and the 
climate conditions) there is an excellent instrumental variable that can be used for malaria 
prevalence to help us to test the proposition that malaria “causes” poverty rather than vice versa. 
 
Malaria Risk 
  As the main measure of malaria risk, I use an indicator based on the 1994 WHO world 
map of malaria risk.  By overlaying the world map of malaria risk with a map of world 
population, my colleagues and I have calculated the proportion of each country’s population that 
live with risk of malaria transmission, labeled MAL94P.  An alternative measure, introduced in 
Gallup and Sachs (1998), and used in AJR and RST, multiplies the MALP94 index by an 
estimate of the proportion of national malaria cases that involve the fatal species, Plasmodium 
falciparum, as opposed to three largely non-fatal species of the malaria pathogen (P. vivax, P. 
malariae, and P. ovale).  This index is called MALFAL.  Sub-Saharan Africa has a very high 
proportion of malaria cases that are falciparum malaria, whereas in the Americas, Europe, and 
much of Asia, a higher proportion of malaria vivax cases is found.       
  Neither measure is a completely satisfactory index of the intensity of disease transmission 
or the burden of the disease in terms of morbidity and mortality.  The basic problem is that the 
number of cases of malaria reported annually to WHO is a tiny fraction of the total number of 
malaria cases in a given year.  That is why we rely on a measure of population at risk rather than 
actual infections.  Most malaria cases in Africa are self treated if they are treated at all.  Even 
deaths due to malaria are often unreported or are not classified by cause of death.  There are also   6
deep clinical issues in the attribution of cause of death in the case of malaria.  Two kinds of 
errors can occur.  Some deaths may occur due to other causes but be attributed to malaria since 
the individual may simultaneously be infected by malaria.  Alternatively, some deaths attributed 
to other causes may indeed have malaria as a co-factor, but not the sole or even principle cause.  
Also, multiplying MALP94 by the share of falciparum introduces one error while correcting 
another.  It is important to distinguish countries burdened by falciparum from those suffering 
mainly or solely from non-fatal variants.  On the other hand, in a case where falciparum is, say, 
50% of all clinical cases, it may still be true that 100% of the public is at risk of falciparum 
infection.  It would be best to make an index of percent of population at risk of falciparum 
infection, but we don’t have data of that sort available. 
  Malaria is intrinsically a disease of warm environments because a key part of the life 
cycle of the parasite (sporogony) depends on a high ambient temperature.  This is, in essence, 
why malaria is a disease of the tropics and the sub-tropics.  Falciparum malaria requires even 
higher temperatures than vivax malaria.  Malaria also depends on adequate conditions for 
mosquito breeding, mainly pools of clean water, usually due to rainfall ending up in puddles, 
cisterns, discarded tires, and the like.  As a result, malaria has a distinct seasonality in the sub-
humid tropics, where wet and dry seasons alternate, and mosquito breeding and hence malaria 
follows the rainy season.  Additionally, the intensity of malaria transmission depends on the 
specific mosquito vectors that are present.  All malaria is transmitted by mosquitos of the genus 
anopheles.  Some anopheles species, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, show a high 
preference for taking their blood meals from humans (anthropophagy) as opposed to animals 
such as cattle.  These human-biting vectors lead to much more intensive transmission of the 
disease.    7
The temperature, mosquito abundance, and vector specificity can be combined into a 
single measure of Malaria Ecology (ME), an ecologically-based variable that is predictive of 
malaria risk. (Kiszewski et. al., forthcoming).   The basic formula for ME includes temperature, 
species abundance, and vector type.  The underlying index is measured on a highly disaggregated 
sub-national level, and then is averaged for the entire country.  Because ME is built upon 
climatological and vector conditions on a country-by-country basis, and is therefore exogenous 
to public health interventions and economic conditions, ME provides an ideal instrumental 




  The key is to estimate equation (1), in order to test whether malaria risk helps to explain 
cross-country patterns of national income after controlling for the quality of institutions.   In 
order to do this, both the institutional quality and the malaria prevalence variables should be 
instrumented.  I use three instruments. 
KGPTEMP.  This variable measures the share of a country’s population in 
temperate ecozones, based on the Koeppen-Geiger ecozone classification system.  
(Mellinger, Gallup, and Sachs, 2000). 
 
LOGMORT.  This variable, created by AJR based on a range of source materials, 
is an estimate of mortality rates of British soldiers and other populations in the 
early 19
th century, and has been used as an instrumental variable for institutional 
quality in all three papers. 
 
ME.  This variable, described above, provides an instrument for malaria risk that 
controls for the fact that causation may run not only from malaria to income but 
also from income to malaria. 
 
Since the AJR sample of ex-colonies covers only 64 countries, it is convenient to use KGPTEMP 
as an additional instrument for institutional quality in order to estimate (1) for a larger sample of 
                                                 
2 This variable was generated together with colleagues of mine at the Harvard Center for International Development.   8
countries in the AJR and RST data sets.
3  Institutional quality is strongly positively correlated 
with the percentage of the population living in temperate-zone ecologies, so that KGPTEMP is a 
useful instrument.
4     
  The left-hand-side variable in each case is GNP per capita, PPP adjusted, in 1995.  Each 
paper uses a slightly different version of this variable, so I use the same definition as in the 
original paper.  Each paper also uses a distinct measure of institutional quality, and again, I use 
the same variable as in the respective papers. 
  The regression results are shown in Table 1.  Each regression uses two-stage-least-
squares to estimate the log income in 1995 as a function of institutional quality and malaria risk.  
For the large sample of countries, we use two instruments (KGPTEMP and ME), while for the 
smaller set of countries in the AJR and EL papers, LOGMORT is added as an instrument.  For 
each of the three papers there are four regressions, based on the two malaria variables, and the 
smaller or larger set of instruments. 
  The results are strong and robust.  In every single regression, both the quality of 
institutions and the malaria risk variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 percent level, and 
in most cases at the 0.01 percent level.  The null hypothesis is decisively rejected in all three data 
sets, both for the larger number of countries (using KGPTEMP and ME as instruments) and for 
the smaller number of countries (using all three instrumental variables).           
  In Table 2, I add an additional right-hand-side geographical variable, the share of the 
national population living within 100km of the coast.  For a variety of reasons, including 
overland transport costs, we should expect that countries with coastal populations should enjoy 
                                                 
3 In the EL paper, the quality of institutions variable is defined only for 62 countries in any event.   
4 The positive relationship between institutional quality and KGPTEMP may be due to the fact that European settlers 
preferred to settle in familiar temperate-zone settings, as suggested by AJR, though many alternative hypotheses are 
also possible.     9
higher per capita incomes than countries with substantially hinterland or even landlocked 
populations.  We see that this is true in the large sample of countries (using AJR and RST) but is 
not evident in the smaller sample of countries in the EL data set.  
 
Conclusions   
  The chief strength of the AJR, EL, and RST papers is that a clear null hypothesis is 
advanced.  As Karl Popper taught many years ago, the failure to reject a null hypothesis on one 
set of data does not imply the correctness of the hypothesis more generally.  This paper shows, 
indeed, that the null hypothesis may be readily rejected using an alternative geographical 
variable: malaria risk.  A more complete model of development, however, will require that we 
move beyond the simple specifications tested in the three papers reviewed in this note.  There is 
good theoretical and empirical reason to believe that the development process reflects a complex 
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